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I.  I  ntr_eqluqlietr,
The  Fedpr;l  n.rni-lqi i  Tn€rrrrn,-F  i:.,lFnnration  iFDIC)  tras  Cl.  e:{ted
over  five  decades  ago  for  the  purpose  o+  increa=inB  the  €tability
of  tht  bankj.ng  systern.  YEt.  -is  with  all  suf,h  rEql-rlatory
aqencies,  the  intended  effect=  cf  its  policies  snd  the  atrtual
e++ects  are  likely  to  di++Er--and  the  di++erence  is  lil.ely  to
increase  with  time.  In  thiE  paper  we identi+y  the  actual  ef+ects
o+  the  FDItr'5  pricing  policies  in  the  cLrrrent  bankinB  env:Ftrn-
ment.  l,le conclLrde  that.  cor-rpl  ed  with  partial  der€gulation.  thEse
pricinq  po1icies  are  no  destabili:ing  rather  thtsn  stabili!inq
I
the  banhinq  systern.
Section  II  FreEents  s  simtrle  model  in  v'rhitrh  the  respcnse  c+
banlls  to  the  incentives  they  fgce  can  be  conveniently  disct-tseed,
Section  III  identi+ies  the  narliet  +orces  traditional  l.r  held  in
rhecl{  by  reqLrlatory  constt.iints.  Secti on  IV  dealE  Hlth  thEse
safie  fiarliet  +orces  in  a  partially  deregulated  enviFonrnent.  and
relates  the  srgurments  to  the  currently  high  and  increasing  ban,l-
failure  rate,  Seclion  V  argLres  thet  the  interaction  betl're*n
remaining  requlati6ns  and  marLet  forces  is  1itrel-v  tc  create
long-term,  or  strt.lctlrFal  ,  inEt*hility.  Secti€n  vi  srmmar-i:e=  oLtr
vi en.A  Si. mDl e  f'l{]dFl.
ThE rate  o+  return  ttr  the  banl.tin€ systEri  as  a  whole  re{lect€
the  rateE  of  return  t6  individLLal  banltino  +iFms.  These
individLrel  rates  E+ return  can  vary  4rc]m neqative  ratEs  that  may
lead  tB  bankruptcy  to  positive  rates  that  cBnstitLlte  supernormal
prBfits--dependin'J  Lrp6n thE  qLral  ity  of  thE  banti's  entFepreneur-
ship  snd  the  particLrlar  EnviFonfftent  i.n which  it  operat€s.  It
$i11  bF  convenient  !n  renrcraenf  +h,r n|-nfitability  6f  the  banhinq
=ystem  as  a  whole--and  hence  the  pro{it  prc}spEcts  for  an
individl-ral  bank--  with  a  distribr.rtion  of  rer-urrng to  the  assFt
portfol  ios  held  by  the  different  banks.
A normal  distriblrtion!  as  Llsed in  FiBLrre  l  and  in  all
st-tbsequrent  +iqLrres!  can  repFesent  the  rst€s  o+  FetLrrn  to  asset
pcrtfolios  across  the  banliinq  gy5tpm  fBr  a  given  accoLtntinq
p(-.riad.  The  actnal  rste  of  profit  for  that  peritrd  will  depEnd
uFon  several  other  +actors  aE;  well.  For  eash  benh  the  capital
basE.  the  costE  o+  borrou)ing.  and  other  cclstE  o+  operation  al.  1
ccme  into  plav.  In  oFdEr  to  f oclrs  attention  on  the  asset
Port+o1ios  ,:f  indi.vidr-ta]  banLs  and  of  the  banhing  =ystem  as  a
whole.  none  of  these  other  +actctrs  are  treatEd  as  stocha5tic
vqri.ables  in  the  Dresent  nodel .
In  the  absence  of  any  sFeci+ic  hnor,uledge of  the  di++erien-
tial  abilities  ot  the  different  banlis.  the  lEcati6n  aIDng  th€
ratE-c+-return  spectrum  o{  any  gi'/en  ban}r will  be  attributed  to
randEm  f scters-  ThE rnein  rate  of  FEtLlrn  i s  consi stEnt  r.,  i th  the
rates  tr+ profit  in  sther  industries.  ThE variance  of  the  distrj.-
ht.rtion  rEflpcts  the  composition  of  the  banf,:s'  plrt{olios.  The









F  igurelc'cation  o+  a  qiven  banl.  6i)  r-h€ distribLrtion  rEpregents  the
rEtLtrn  to  its  6urn pol-t+trl ie--rahi.ch  itself  reflects  a  distriburtion
of  retrrrns  across  thr  asspts  within  that  portfc,tio.  Thurs. Figr-ire
1.  as  well  a=  the  sub:eqltEnt  figure=,  have  two  difierent.  br-rt
complementary!  interpretations.  E:.:  ante,  the  distrib|.ttiBns
depict  the  prospects  tf  a  representative  banl...  (This  perspective
tnal{es use  o"f the  {arniliar  "  reprpren  tat i ve-f  i.rm,, csn=truct.  )  Ei{
pogt,  the  distribLrtions  dEtrict  the  trortfolio  rates  of  rFturns  to
the  bankinq  system  as  6  taho1e.
Initial  1y.  we consi.der  an  unregulated  banking  ey=tem  whose
banhs  pr-rrchase deposi.t  insnrance  f rorn privately  6perated
lnsljrantrE  ctrfiFanies,  I'Jith  due  allohjances  {or  risf,:  aversion  and
other  non-pecunj.ary  csnsiderations.  the  mean rate  of  return!
indicated  by  Hm in  FigLrre  laF  aLlows  {or  a  normal  profit  rate
eqLral  to  that  of  indu=try  as  a  whole,  Each  banla operetes  f rorn a
cipitsl  base  that  al1or+s  it  to  e>:perience  bel GH-aveFAqe return5
on  its  isEetg  without  jecpardy  to  the  bank  €r  to  its  depo5itt3rs.
HoHe.rer.  j.  f  a  bank'  s  pertf  ol,  i a  vi el d=  a  rate  of  rer-urn  bel osr some
"criticai  rater"  Rc.  the  capital  base  is  ccmplEtply  eroded  and
the  bank  +-aceg banlirlrptcy.  The  di++eren€r.  then.  betr^JEen  Rc  arrd
Rm is  a  reflectitrn  c4  the  bank'q  caDitel  base.  In  the  ab€'ence of
deFo=it  insurance.  losses  aEsocisted  with  rate€  of  retLrrn  belcw
F:c woLtld be  suffered  by  the  bant:"  s  depositors.  (The  qeneral
Frovi.sicln  of  limitEd  Liability.  o+  cour5er  HoLrld protect  bantl
Ewrrers  f rDm  I osses  that  e:lceed  the  b;nt,:t  s  cacital  . )
E{ecause o+  rist:  a'rersisn  on  the  part  sf  thE  bantrs'
depoeitBrs.  it  Hj.  11  be  in  the  interest  of  each  banll  to  plirchase
dEposit  inslrr-anre.  The  cD€t  o+  thiE  insurance.  if  =Ltppl  ied
f,cc,mpEtiti./e1_,*.  r.ri  11  re+lect  the  pcrtion  c+  the  rate-tr+-retLtrr
distribLrtisn  belst.l Fic,  In  effect.  the  area  of  the  distribLttian
be+-Heen  fiinLts  in+initv  and  Rc  is  ''sold"  to  thE  insltrer,  The  mean
of  the  distribLrtion  remains  urnchan,;ed1 the  purchasin'l  cf  deposit
inslrrance  serves  only  to  convert  a  troFtion  o+  that  distribLrtion
into  j.tE  e)ipected  vslue.  The  capital  hase  and  deposit  in=lrrance,
Hhi ch  are  =,Lrbst  i tutes  at  the  rnarrSi  n  +rofi  the  banli' s  poi nt  af
viewr  are  used  in  some cornbinatj.trn  to  protect  the  deptrsj.tors  +Fom
losses.  The  capital  base  Frotects  the  depositors  {rom  minor
losses  thet  are  likely  tc  {fccuri  dEposit  in=urance  protects  thetn
trom  catastraphic  losses  that  are  unlikely  to  occLlF.  Fic rnarhs
thE  boundry  bethreen  the  twa  methcds  of  providinq  this  protectiDn,
There  will  be  a  temporary  Lrpward adjLrstrnent  in  the  overal  l
ratE  o+  profit  to  the  banl";in'l  j.ndl(stry  ag  a  result  of  the  depcsit
insuranc€:  Rj.sk-averse  depositor-s  will  now  be  willinq  to  actrept  a
1o.,ler yield  i.n e>rchange {or  the  added  EecLrrity.  BLlt ctrmpetitivt
forces  will  brin'l  those  higher  rites  of  profit.  which  reflect  the
gains  from  poolinq  risl:.  bacir  in  linE  r,Ii  th  pro{it  levels  in
other  industr  j.e=.  As  shouJn in  Figlrre  1b,  the  deposit  i.nsnrance
Hould  resLllt  in  a  leftward  shi{t  ir'  Rc  (and  hence  an  adjLrstment
in  the  inst-lrance  premium).  as  lDHer  borrawing  costs  wcurlC allow
thE  bankE  to  slrrvi.ve  lor+er  asset  viElds.
Apart  from  considert'tiong  o{  "adverse  selection"  and  "m6ral
harard"  "  no  f ur-ther  adjustments  to  the  purchssing  of  deposit
in=urance  are  called  for.  And  thesp  are  trroblerns  that
cornpetitive  insur&nae  ctranpanies nit.lst cc'p€ Hith  in  911  aregs  in
which  they  o{+er-  insLrrancF.  The  different  ban},;s are  not  eq,.lal  lylikely  to  have  a  retnrn  on  their  asEet  portfolios  that  lies  belcw
Rc.  The  litrelihood  o+  tratastroFhicelly  I  ou'r  return=  r.ri  l1  depend.
L  n  part,  Ltpc,n  the  the  i ndi vi dual  bsn[,:'  s  r i sli  FrEf erEnres--i  t:3
willingnass  to  accept  risk  in  clrdFr  ttr  increise  titE  elipected
retLrrn  to  itg  aggets.  Strrrre  banks  aFe  aggressivei  others  are
consErvative.  Competitively  EuFplied  deposi.t  ingurance  r+i11
involve  a  treFtain  amount  of  adverse  select  j.on,  that  is,  o{
inslrring  too  many agqressive  banl".iE  and  toE  +eH conservative
banks.  Ins|-rreFs  will  have  an  incentive  to  di.scover  di fferences
in  risl-.:-pref  erenceg  ameng  banf;s  and  ttr  stFlrtrtLlre  thei.r  insura{nce
premiums  atrcordingly.  burt--as  with  aII  other  forms  trf  insurance--
innate  informational  dif{erences  bethreen  the  insLlrerer  and  tnE
i.nsLtred mav preclLrde  a  market  cutcome  in  which  the5e  differences
are  fulIy  re+lected  in  the  stFuctLrrp  o+  the  preniums.
As  a  meang of  dealing  Hith  the  problern  of  m6ral  harard,
catnpetitive  insLtFance  compani.es  can  be  €xpEcted  to  stop  short  o4
providinE  full  coveraqe.  Thie  will  qive  the  depositor  an
incentive  to  survey  the  pol ici.es  of  the  various  bsnks  before
choosing  trne parti  cr-tl  ar  banh  and  then  to  monitor  the  behavior  of
thet  bank  with  Fespect  to  its  portfolio  .nanagement.  SlLch surv€yg
and  rnonitoFing  services  ftay  be  provided  by  str.ne tpublic  ctr
FrivstE)  bani.;-reting  agentry.  Fi'lurE  1c.  in  |.,hich  inEured  los=es
are  confined  to  the  shaded  arEar  sLrqgestsi =everal  urays in  whj.ch
the  insllrance  companies  might  intentionalLy  LFave  the  banks'
depc,sitors  exposed  tD  96rne rislr.  First!  the  in=LrrEr  pays
ntrthing  trnless  the  retl.lFn  on  the  benl"i's  pcrt+olio  {al1=  a
Fr=scri  bed  di stance  beI or.'r  Rc.  sa'/.  to  Rd.  Thi s  urni  ngerred  I c]5=.
h,hiCh  COnstitute=  a  ".rErl,,Fl-i  hl E  Iree,'^ay  be  spread  san6r.lg
5depos j.tor:  or'  a  l Lrmp-st-rrn  hasj.E.  Secsnd.  trver  the  ranqe  a+  Ftrrt-
f rlli.f  returnE.  +rcm  Rd dchJn to  Rn"  for  which  the  ingLtrer  hae
Iiability,  the  covErRqe  is  lees  thsn  1{l{l percent,  The  depo=itor
r:
bears  --o.ne  percentage  of  the  lBss!  say,  10 ttr  ?(:)  percent.  And
third,  if  the  bank'E  actual  portfolio  return  is  below  Ru.  the
lrpper  limrt  of  the  trsveraqe,  the  insLtrEF  trovers  only  the  los=
associated  with  Ft-t.  Thiq  :cnerf  n{  rrqt.  er{posuFe  provides  a
incentive  for  depositors  tB  avoid  banks  that  engage  in  shoot-the-
rnoon i nvestment  strategi  es"  and  hence  i t  di sco|-trsqes  ban[.s  +ro.n
adtrpti ng  s|-rch strateqi  es,
Figure  1c  i L  lLrstrates  a  possible  outcome  of  the  interaction
bethreen  banks.  ban[l  depositor=,  and  deposit  insurrers.  And  FLrch
an  outcFfie  Nould  be  a  stab L  E_one--stab  I e,  at  least,  with  respect
to  the  pararneters  discl.tssed.  That  isr  EVen  in  the  absence  o+
reg  lat  j.on,  none  of  the  agentE  invelved  can  talte  advantage  of  the
circurn5tances  depicted  by  altering  that  part  o+,his  ohin b€havior
that  gave  riEe  to  thoge  circumstances.  ThiE  res|-ilt  sLrggests  that
theFe  aFe  no  internal  intrDnsistencies  cr  inherent  pervErsities  in
the  cc,mpetitive  forcEs  that  govern  deposit  i.n€ti.tutionE  in  thei.r
r€lationship  to  depositors  and  deFosit  in€Llrers"  The  cornpeti tive
solLttion  alEt]  provides  a  p6int  sf  departure  for  the  discu=sion  o+
dep€sit  insLrr€nc€  that  is  nat  provided  competitively.  FtrIicieE
adtrpted  by  the  FDIC,  for  inEtance,  create  incentivies  that  are
inconsiEtent  with  th,-  ',-Ec'rIf<  noni -+6.1 in  FigLlre  1.  The
paFticular  HayB in  iahich  the  banl{s  :lnd  the  banke'  depo=itor=
rEact  to  the=e  incentives  depend  LrpEn  the  rEgt.rlatary  environment
that  the',./  +ace.  In  the  next  two  gectiens.  we  identify  these
breactionE  and  thEir  =  in  {i--t  a  reqlrlated  and  then  a
Far-t  i R  I iy  dereglrlated  envirtrnmEnt.
IrI.  Esb=ldlred  l!=grBnce  in  B EeSslgled EnyirgBment.
The  environment  in  which  banks  actlral  lv  ooerate  is  substan-
tially  different  from  the  one  assurned in  the  discLrssion  sbove.
The  actlral  enviroftrnent  is  in  some HavE rn6re favorable  and  in
other  w:{ys Iess  favorable  ttr  banks  in  compaFiscn  to  R ctrmpetitive
envj.ranrnent.  Fecause  o+  the  Fricing  poli.cieE  of  the  FDICr  the
bsnks  are  able  to  buv  deoosit  insurance  ftrr  a  feE  that  is  nor
establ  ished  bv  some actL(Farial  procedLrFe.  The  fee  actlrally  paid.
then,  dtres  not  reflect  the  trlle  risl:  frEEumed  by  the  insurer,
Fecarrse  trf  a  number  of  regul.atory  ctrnstrai.nts.  hoHevEr.  the  banks
cannot  +ul1y  respond  to  th€  j.ncentives  crEated  by  the  {svorable
premrLlms trn depclsit  insurrance.  The  regulatory  constraints  th;t
come into  play  includE  {1)  interest-rate  ceilings,  (!)  entry
restFictionE,  (3)  asset  restrictionsr  and  (4)  capital-adEquacy
rEqLrrrements.  The  rn6deI developed  ir'  Section  II  can  be  LiEed tc
di scurss the  incentives--and  hence  the  rnsrf{et  forceg--created  bv
s|-rbsidired  deposit  inEurance  in  the  contExt  o+  th€sE  re€ulat6ry
c  on  str ii  nts.
At  Fresent  the  FDIC  collects  f ro.fl each  insur€d  bank  a  yearly
PFemiufli c{  one-twelfth  of  trne peFcent  o{  all  dornegti.c deposlts.
IJnCEF  noFmal  triFcLrmstances,  sixty  percent  of  this  arnE|.int  ta+tFr
operatinq  elipenses  .1re dEdLrcted)  i s  rebated  to  the  banks  af-
year'  s  end.  For  thi  s  trFemi  Ltflr, r.rh  i rh  j.  s  Llnrel ated  to  the  ltranl,:'  s
Iendinq  FoIicie5!  each  banl:  buys  staturtory  pratecti  on  for  th€3first  $1Oc].i:)uo  of  each  separate  dorne=tic  account.  In  pr3cti.cer
however.  the  protection  is  n€t  limlted  to  thE  SIL)lrr{){){r.  In  cases
of  actLlal  bani,: +ai lLlreg,  the  FDIE  typical  l y  arrrngeE  +or  al l  the
failed-banti's  liabiliti€s--btrth  insured  and  Lrni.  nsLLred--t6  be
assuned  by  sorne other  deposit  institLrtion.  This  practice  ig
tantamournt  to  the  provisi.on  of  full  coveraqe.  Untll  thF  failure
in  ,nid-198:  of  the  Fenn  Square  Banf,:  n N.  A.,  in  Oklahorna City.
this  pol icy  of  "FurtrhaEe  and  Assumption"  had  beEn  the  norm  fcr
deal i.ng with  the  failure  trf  large  banks.  FLrll  coverage  has  nclt
alwaye  been  extended  j,n this  Earne  rrranner to  the  srnaller  bankg.
bt.lt s|-tch bsnks  are  lesE  lihely  ta  have  deFositsnthat  Eliceed  the
5141Q,  f)r-rO  statutory  I i.mi.t  on  insurance  .o,r*."r*. 
-
The  preniurns  actually  charged  by  the  FDIC  and  the  coverage
actLral I y  provided  aFe  too  cornpleli  to  al1ow  for  a  si.nple  rEckanirrg
of  the  pf+ective  sLrbsidy  tB  deposit  institutions,  Eutt by  pricing
the  insuFance  independent  of  the  banks'  port+olj.o  decisions  and
providing  coverage  beyond  the  statutory  1imit"  the  FDIC  virtt.lally
guarantees  that  banks'  ri str-tat.inq  behavicr  is  being  e{+etrtively
s|.tbsidi=ed.  Horeover.  even  if  the  FDIC  L.rpre  to  i.ntrodLrcE  a
variable-rate  pricing  scheme  for  deposit  ingurance,  pnblic  chtrice
theory  predicts  that  brreaucratic  incentives  H€u1d  stand  in  the
way  of  its  correctly  pr j.cing  risl{.  Fepresentatives  of  individual
bankg  and  of  the  benlring  industry  wor-rld lobby  eBainst  errors  of
overpri,cing.  BLrt there  woutld  be  no  lobbying  agaj.nsi-  errors  ef
+F,6 -hhrE.i +a  c^,,r-  Thr_rs"  the  incentives  +ar  av6iding  the  over-
5
pricinB  of  rieli  wo|-rld indLrce  the  FDIC  tca Lrnderpritre  it.
Estimating  the  i,rpact  o+  the  FDIC  sr-rbgidy in  quantitative  tertng
!.rolrl  d  require  a  determination  of  the  actlrarial  valu€  of  tl'te risl.
t5a5ELtrned  by  the  FDIC  and.  in  tLrrn.  a  caitrulaticn  af  the  dolIar
valLLe of  the  sr-rbsj.dy,  Fut  in  the  absence  trf  any  spe.-i{ic
ltnowledge  of  the  Eubsidy's  act|.ral  rnagnit  de,  its  irnpact  can  be
dtsc]-rssed  j.n  qualitative  terms-  E'ren in  the  event  th;t  the
sLtbsidy  is  negative  in  magnitude  (a  possibility  that  i:  at  oddE
ulith  ol.rr general  understanding  o+  the  relEitionghip  betwEen  thF
o
regulator  and  the  regn).atee  ).  thE  qualitative  discuEsicrn--with
spprtrpriate  modi{i  trati ons--raourld  be  relevant.  In  fact.  a
demonstratitrn  of  the  discr-rssion's  irrelevancE  HtrLr1d  reeuiFe  a
demonstFati6n  that  the  pricing  policies  s*  the  FDIC  are
undi++Erentiable  in  any  systernatic  way  from  the  pricing  policiEs
of  competi ti ve  insurer5.
The  qualitative  imFact  of  the  FDItr  surbsi.dy tran best  be
tnodeled  by  c6nsj.dEring  the  FoIar  case  in  which  +ui1  coverage  is
provi  ded  at  no  coEt.  in  terrns  a{  Fi gr-rre 1a!  the  deposi tors  are
insured  tsg3inst  any  lcsses  aEEociated  !.rith  port+Elio  rates  of
return  below  Rc.  fn  effect,  the  expected  valLle  of  that  Fortion
-,f  J"hE,'li  clri  h,,+i  Ah which  is  neEative  in  fiRilnitLlde"  is  remrved
from  the  depositors'  cansidEr:ttit]n  at  no  cost  to  the  banhE,  Nad
the  banl':s pai.d  an  actlrerial  ly  sonnd  prernium  for  the  insurance.
the  ftpan rate  of  rFtuFn  to  their  pDrt+olios--n€t  (]+ the  in--ursncE
prEmiLlrn--wot.lld h;ve  rernained  unchannEd.  {This  Has  the  case
depicted  in  Fi gure  1b. )  lrJith  a  sr-rbsidired  insurance  prernium.  a
=ero  Fremilrm  in  the  polar  ca:ie  bein,l  mad.eled,  the  €f+EctivE  ffesn
i.s  incrEased  frtrfi  Rrn  to  R= as  shown  in  Fignre  ?.  That  is.  even
in  the  absenre  of:ny  chinges  in  ihe  banl,s'  portfalios.  -.he
rel  evant  di stri  br-rti Bn  Ef  ocrtf  tr}l  i,  B  ratLrrng  has  been  gliel,Jed ttr  theRc Rs
Figure 2right  and,  :trrrespondinBly.  the  rnEan  rate  o+  r-eturn  has  been
;
l nrrEa_cied.
The  new rnean rate  o+  retLrrn "  Rg.  ref l ects  the  El:ewnesE o{
the  ciiEtributti  sn  and  translates  into  supernorma).  profit=  to  the
banl.rinE indnstry.  ThiE  iE  the  direct  ef{ect  of  the  depcsit-
lnsurance  sLtFsidy.  To  the  elrtent  that  re,;r-rlation  prevents  the
indi  vi dlral  banf,:s +rom  reacti  nq  to  the  surbsi  dy  and  to  the  ELtp€F-
norrnal  profit5  made Fossible  by  the  subsidy.  the  banhinq  indnstry
is  sefer,  Iess  risl{yt  than  it  otherkrise  wourld be.  In  ef+ect!  the
FDIC  insurlates  the  bankinq  cornrnunity  agsinst  fiarkEt  forces  that
coutld  erode  its  cspi.tal  base.  The  protectlon  o+  thF  capital  base
and  the  consequent  reduction  of  the  actual  number  o{  bank  fail-
ures  is,  in  {act.  the  explicit  objective  of  the  FDIC.  ELtt the
under-pricing  of  the  deposit  insurance  drives  a  hJFdqe  hetr4€en  the
interests  of  the  FDIC  and  the  interests  of  the  individLlal  bankg
that  mahe up  the  bantting  commun  j.ty.  Only  if  these  individual
tranks  can  be  perslraded--or  coerced--into  acting  in  the  interests
of  the  FDIC  ra.+-her than  in  their  own  individr-ral  interests.  wi I I
the  in=ulation  endure  through  t j.me.  l{hat  refiains  to  bE  shtrwn are
the  specific.  Felationsh  j.ps  between  individr-ra1  regulations  and  the
sl.rbsidy  created  by  the  underpricing  o+  deposit  ingurance.
The  variolrs  regulaticns  that  bantls  cLrrrently  +acer  or  that
they  have  fatred  in  the  past.  alI  have  hiEtorieE  of  thEir  trwn.
The  actual  imposition  6+  sorne of  these  requlaticns  may have  bEen
LrnrEJated,  €r  only  tangEntially  related.  tc  thE  lncentives
created  by  eubsi  di red  deposi  t  j.  n.-!-rrancE.  Er-rt the  FLrrFtrsEE of  the
pFeser't  Ciscussitrn  will  be  se|-ved  if  Each  particulir  r-egLll.atitrn
!e  treated  3s  if  its  objective  ereFe to  trFsvent  the  individual
1flbanlrs  frrm  exFlriting.  trr  lEveraginE.  thE  benefits  af  surbsidi:ed
deFosit  insl.rrantre  to  the  detri'"ent  o+  the  bantting  s,r..=tEm  as  a
wh61e.  (A  summary of  actual  J.egislative  acts  from  1977 to
FresEnt  rs  provided  in  the  Appendix.  )  The  individl-ral
regulations  can  be  iteftired  and  identified  in  terrns  of  the  para-
meters  of  Figure  :  The  following  Bection  r.ri  11  discuss  the
e+fects  o+  dereBLrlation  in  terms  of  these  sarne pararneterE.
tl)  !e!gqg9!:Ee!e  eE1_Lf.ESg.  The  supernormaJ.  pro{its  mad€
Possible  by  sllbsidired  insurance  cFeate  in  i.ncentive  +or  banris  rtr
bid  f or  mclre f LLnds  f rofi  dep€Fitors  in  order  to  take  f r-tlIer
tdvantage  o{  the  sr-rbsidy.  Regr-rlaticn  A.  hihich  F,uts  6n  intere€!-
rate  cei 1  i ng  on  banti  deposi ts!  L:eep= the  sLrbsi  dy  f ram  bei ng
passFd  on  to  the  depositors  as  a  FesLllt  trf  this  competitive
pFocess.  To  the  extent  that  it  can  be  enforcedn  Fiequlstion  Q
holds  down the  cost  o+  borrowi.no  and  hence  hold=  dawn  the
partfolio  rate  of  rEturn  needed  tt:  avoid  banl';rupt€y.  fn  teFms  o+
Figure  !.  Fegr-rlation  0  prevent=  troftpetitive  forces  {rorn  nLrd,:ing
Rc  ri ghtward.
(3)  Entcy  Eg=lrlqlions.  Tht:se  sa'rte supernorrnal  profits
;.ttract  new  entrants  into  the  bantring  industry.  I+  the  pro+it
levels  aFe  to  be  maintained,  entry  must  be  artificially
restricted.  In  terms  of  Figure  !.  entry  restricticlns  prevent  nel4
entrants  tron  dri./ing  Rs.  alonq  Hith  the  entire  distribution  of
U
part+oli,o  returns.  1e{tHard.  It  might  be  notEd  that  the  rnartret
f c'rces  impinging  !n  R!: frlffi  the  1E+t  and  cn  Rs  {rcrn  the  riEht  arE
ai:tuaL ly  intertwinEd.  l'1ore sFeci+ically.  to  the  er'{tent  thst
bank5  can  circumvent  p],-=gul  sti  cn  Gi  and  thereby  attraEt  ffic,re  +ut.]Cg
i1to  inve=t.  thev  rq  i.  11  bid  down  Fs.  And  to  the  extent  that  nehr
entrants  j.ncrEss€  the  competition  {c,r  lcansble  funds.  they  wiil
bid  r-rp  Rc.  These  e++€cts  r.loLrl  d  b€  completEly  absent  only  in  the
trase that  both  REgulstion  B  and  the  entrl/  reEtritrtions  r.Jere
FerfEctly  enforced.  For  heuristic  purpases,  hcwevero  it  will  be
ctrnvPnient  to  dEaI  with  FEgulation  Q in  terms  o+  Rc  and  entry
restrictiEns  i.n termE  of  RE,
{3)  Asset  BEElEf_tr!1_SEr.  The  +ect  that  the  price  o{  the
depoEit  insurance  is  Lrnrelated  to  the  risl"iiness  o{  the  banks'
port+a]iog  creates  a  moral-ha:ard  problem.  It  is  nc  l6nger  j.n
thF  interEst  of  individuaL  banlis  to  limit  their  riEk  tat{ino
beha./it:r  to  pnrt{clitrs  whose  retLlrng  are  descrj.bed  by  the  distri-
blrtion  in  FigLtre  3.  Banks  have  an  incentive  to  assr:rre incregsed
riElrs.  Asset  restrictionE  lmposEd  by  the  regnlatory  authority
prevent  banks  frcm  alterin'l  this  distriblrtion  in  thej.r  €++6rt  to
take  f Lrller  advantaEe  of  the  urnderpri ced  inglrrance.  In  effectt
rFstrictions  on  a5sets  restFain  the  marllet  +trrces  that  deternine
the  variance  of  the  port+oi  j.o distribl.rtion.
t4)  ECpllq!:tdegLraqy  E€gqitrEqeEls.  The  di=tance  between  Rc
snd  Fls is  maintaj.ned  1*rgel  y  by  the  cspital  base  of  the  banking
systern.  FecanEe  of  their  caFital.  base.  the  indivj,dnal  banks  can
rna[':e  ] Esges  wi thot-rt  l mposi ng  trosts  on  thei  r  deFtrsi tors  and
t"rithout  callinr]  En  the  FDItr.  ELtt the  inEl-rrance  snb=idy|.  along
with  reBulstlons  {1}  6nd  {3)  discr-rssed  above.  creates  an
incentive  for  the  inciividLral  banlrs  to  detrrease  their  eapital-tc-
asset  ratios.  That  jq-  i+  i n+ErF-+-Frl-o  ceiiin'Js  =tand  in  thE
i.ray Bf  attracti  ng  rr'trr  e  f L(nds.  then  the  banhs  r.r  i I L  tal;e  ad'/antaqe
of  the  suFernorfial  pro{its  by  overe:.:tending  thelr  Exi=ting
1".3F j.tal  base.  Thi s  overe;r+-enEion  }1,i  11.  in  tLLrn.  rEduce  the
spread  betr.Jeer]  Rc  and  Rs  for  the  bant{j.ng s,vsterr as  a  whole.
The  confli.t  between  the  interegts  of  the  individLral  bantiq
and  the  i.ntereEts  of  the  regulatory  authority  can  be  stated  in
teFms  o+  the  market  valt-te s+  hanlt  chartErg.  The  '/alue  of  the
charter"  r.,Jhich  re+lEcts  the  present  valuE  tr+ aI I  {,-rtlrre  super-
normal  pro+i.ts.  is  part  o+  thE  bank's  capital  ss  faF  as  the
individual  bank  is  concerned,  burt it  ts  not  part  of  the  capltal
that  csunts  towards  capital  adequacy  so  far  as  the  regulator  ig
concErned.  The  purpose  o{  trap  i tE(L  -adequacy  requirEnents  iE  to
ftrrce  the  banker  to  tske  the  reilLrlator's  pBj.nt  of  view  when
.naking  decisions  that  affect  the  bank'E  catrital-to-asset  ratio.
By  discussing  the  varioLrs  regLrlation5  in.terr's  of  the  para-
neterE  of  Figure  !,  ue  have  identified  the  incentives  createo  oy
the  depogi t-insnrance  subsidy  and  the  trsrresponding  maf.liet  forces
keFt  in  check  by  the  requrlations.  The  next  step  is  to  see  what
happens  Hhen  some cf  these  trhecks  are  rernoved  in  the  proces=  of
dereguletion.  As  we will  demonstratE,  thE  adjLlstfient  o+  the
paf.am€teFs  to  deregulatlon  has  impLications  about  the  risl.:
(created  and)  ssslrmed by  thE  FDIC  and  aboLrt the  lonq-rLrn
=tsbi  l ity  o{  the  bantii.ng  system.
IV.  9gb_g!di=esl  InEuralge  UAdCr  EAf,!t_€.! SeECSulE!1.oD-
The  intended  effect  of  anv  r-esulation  is  to  hold  in  checf,:
some partitruLar  set  of  rnarl:et  fDrces.  BLrt th€  j.ncentives  under-
lying  these  rnarliet  forceE  are  not  eI imi.nated.  In  +acl"  io  the
extent  thst  the  regLrlation  is  e+fective.  prc'f it  eFportunitj.Es
1f,that  r.iould elrist--bLrt  {cr  the  re'lLrl  ati  ons--wi  l1  incrEsEe  $ver
t1me.  and  the  ctrrreEForldir'g  incentivEs  14i11 grnH  =trtrn€er.  i+
marliet  Farticipants  are  nt]t  alltrured  to  resptrnd  dir€ctly  ttr  thE
incentives  they  +6ce.  then  they  will  have  an  incentivE  to  circum-
vEnt  or  elirninate  the  regulations  that  stand  j.n tha  way.  At  this
sta'Je  in  the  regulatory  FrscEEE,  derEgulation  rney become
inevitable.  The  who1eEalF  rernoval  6+  all  the  relevant  reot.rla-
ti.ons.  htrr^Jeverr  rneans an  abrLtpt  restFLrcturing  o{  incenti./es.
l'larket  forces  held  in  check  +or  a  period  of  years  are  snddenly
LrnlEashed.  t^Jhile  the  rTarl.:Et concEFned  ,IIE|V  ha./e  bE=n  R  stable  one
in  the  absencE  o+  regulatisn,  the  responEe  o+  nertlet  participante
to  deregulation  .nay create  short-term  instability,  Further"  i+
sorne--but  not  all--of  the  interrelated  reqLtletians  are  removed,
the  rnarfret  process  that  edjLlsts  thE  dEregerl  ated  asFects  o+  +-he
mart{et  to  the  circumstancEs  cFEated  by  the  re.nainin,J  regul  ati.ons
can  Fesu1t  in  bath  short-term  and  lorig-terrn  instability.  This
gEneral  resnlt  has  a  =Feci+ic  rnanifFEtation  in  the  consequences
a+  dEregulating  the  ban+iin€  indLrstFy  while  ,naintaining  the
ELrb=i  dy  an  deposit  insurance.
The  accompanying  Chart  I.  which  traceE  the  banli  {si  lLrre  r-ate
'fron  79+'3 to  present,  depicts  the  instability  in  a  dramatic  way.
The  divergence  of  this  tirne  serieE  {rom  i.ts  fLat  trend  line
durinq  the  last  t r.l8  years  cal ls  f trr  an  e>lplanatian.  Althor-tgh  the
oriq  j.ns  of  the  preblem  can  be  tracFd  at  leEst  ;s  {ar  baclt  l--  E  the
BanIing  Act  of  19f,3!  !.rhi.  trh trF=ated  the  FDIC,  thE  prtrximatc-
iinpEtLls  |:an  be  +cLtnd in  developrnEnts  in  the  bLLsiness  ,]+ bdn],:inq
ovEr  the  1a=t  t{,Ja  dEcades  and  in  the  ,f  overnment'5  rEactions  tc]o.oo3  2  5
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SOURCE  OF PRII,ARY  DATAI  u.s. DEPARTI,EIIT  oF coMMERcE.  bUREAU  oF THE  cENsUstText  to  accornpany  f,HART 1:  BiiNl'.i  FAILURES  AS  A  PORTION
EF  NUI''IEER  OF  BANl,iS:  1945  TO  FRESENTI
Econometri  c  evidence  corFoborates  the  view  that  struc-
tural  changes  have  occured  in  the  banking  industry.  In
1975  and  again  in  1?83,  the  bantt  failure  rate  jLltnped
drenatically.  The  series  for  the  ptrst-Frar  period  i5
trresented  in  Chart  1- Frior  to  1975.  the  geries  had  no
trend.  Thor-rgh  the  failure  rate  tended  to  intrreasE  in
tryclical  downturns,  it  declined  again  dLiring  tht  rEccjv-
ery.  In  7S7A it  not  only  increased  more  than  in  earlier
post-Har  tryclesi  br-rt it  did  not  revert  to  its  old  levP1 .
A  ststistlcally  siqni{icant  change  in  the  +ailure  rate
occured,  l.',  i.  th  the  rate  fi(f,vl  ng  to  a  permanentl  y  hi Bher
level  .  During  the  three  year5  +Fon  7979  ta  1?81.  the
annual  rate  o{  bank  f aj.  lur€s  was  hi'lher  than  the  +ailLlre
rete  uthi.ch developed  during  the  five  Eyclical  downturng
prior  to  thF  1975  cycle.  The  +ailure  rate  in  1?8"  was
rnore than  double  the  197b  rate.  whi.ch  had  Eet  a  poEt-v.rar
recoFd,  and  it  r6sF  {Lrrther  in  1983.  Freliminary  data  on
bank  {ai  lLrre=  in  1?84  indiEate  that  the  rate  of  failurEg
brilL  again  increase  this  yeaF.thesE  devel aFrnents,
Eteginni.ng in  thE  1?.ClE! rising  ir,{latton  ratEs  c-iLLsEd
ilegrlation  O ttr  becEme increasinqly  binding.  ThE r,riCeninq  'lap
hEtHeFn  the  legal  1y  irnptrsed intFrest  ceiling  and  market-clearin!
interest  l.Rteg  created  strBn'l  incentives  to  find  Hays  of  skirting
such  regulatisnE.  The  res  lt  was  {inancial  inna.rations  in
varioLrs  +errng.  The  clearest  and  mBgt  consFicutrLrs  E){arnpl.Es  of
shirting  the  regulations  are  the  banks'  practice  of  o{fering
giftE  to  their  new depoEitors  a:i  a  means of  biddinq  more  for  the
+Lrnds that  are  sub  j Ect  to  the  1o{.Jest cei I i n'l,  and--moFe
signifi.cant--the  creation  o+  a  market  for  certificate5  t]f  deposii
(CD's).  which  raere sr-rbject  tB  higher  ceilings.  In  additian  to
these  dom*stic  innovations  hras the  €ro*th  and  develop,r'ent  of  the
unregltlated  Eurocurrency  rnarket  urhere borrowin€  and  lending  couJ.d
be  transacted  at  rnarket-clFarinE  interest  rate5.
Fy  the  198Qs rpg|.tlator€  and  leglElatsrs  began  to  adapt  to
the  financial  innovations.  The  l'lanetary  Control  Atrt  o+  1?84-)  Bave
banLs  the  alithBrity  ttr  phase  aLtt  t6ver  a  p€,riod  o+  yerrs)  the
interest  rate  ceilinqs  on  domestic  banh  deposits.  This  gradLral
Frocess  Has  then  actrelErated  by  the  6arn-5t.  Germain  DeFository
In=tituti.cng  Act  of  1981.  Ey  October  af  198tr.  interest  rate
1{)
restritrtions  w€rE  removed  on  rnost  darnEstic  banl'; dEtrBEitE.
The  si.:e  o+  the  banking  j.ndllstry.  lts  collection  trf  assets,
snd  the  cost  of  the  +Ltnds for  plrrchasinB  thoEe  sssets  are  all  ntrw
ad-iLtsting  to  thi=  1egi6latitrn  r^rh  j.ch  allowEd  for  partial
dErEg|.rlation.  The  end  resnlt.  however.  will  n6t  be  the  cne
depict€d  in  Figure  lc.  where  the  intErest=  tr+ banhersr  banl:
deFositors!  and  depc=it  insnrsrs  are  all  brolrqht  i.nto  balanse,
15The  resurlt.  inEtead.  HiII  balancE  the  inleFegts  sf  bBnl:ers  and
hanh  deptrEi tcrs--gi  ven  the  insuFance  ELrbEidy  and  the  lFVeraEE
ftade  possible  by  that  sLrbsidy.
In  dealing  with  the  e+fects  o+  requlation  followed  by
dereglrlationj,  it  is  dif  {icr-rlt  to  separate  and  categorire  all  the
di++erEnt  marl.et  +orces  that  come  into  p1ay.  Sorne  regutiations
p|-tt chFcks  on  Eeveral  dif{erent  maFltet  force=i  and  some ftrrcEs
are  checked  by  more  than  one  regulation,  All  theEe  interacting
forces  are  able  to  work  themselve=  ortt  partly  in  spitF  Ef  the
regu1stion  and  partly  becallse  of  the  dereglrlatitrn.  Further.  the
legiElation  Enabling  derequrlaticn  has  bEen  sFread  cut  o.rEr  timp.
and  th€  rnarl';et's  reaction  to  the  di++erent  a5trects  o+  dErequla-
titrn  requires  dif{erent.  amounts  o+  tirne.  These  consideratitrns
rnaF;e  it  difficult  to  determine  from  an  histaricRl  perspEctive--
f rt]rn the  ebservation  of  thE  ongtrin€  proces=--r+hat  the  End  result
i.  s  1  i kel y  ta  be-  In  order  to  malie thi  €  probL eri  a  rnore tractabl  p
cne.  the  Felevant  fiarliet  forces  can  bE categtrri:ed  j.n  actrtrrds,nce
!.rith  the  discuqsion  in  Section  III.  ThEy  r"jl  l I  be  dealt  with"
then'  in  an  analytical  Fathpr  than  a  chrenological  seql.lence.
However.  the  relatj.snships  between  the  rnarhet  processes  disclrased
ind  thp  circlrmstancEs  thst  cuFrentl-v  cheracteri:E  the  bsntilnq
i nduEtry  shculd  be  apparent,
' FigLlre  Ja  reprodlrces  the  distribr-rtion  o{  portfolio  returns
dep  j.cted  in  FiqurE  i  Hith  the  I oHer  tail  added  back  j.n.  The
shadine  o+  the  area  belor+  Rc  inditrat€s  the  ranr;e  of  por-tfoli,o
returnE  over  Fihich  the  FDIC  is  respon--j.bLe  for  accommcd;-ti.nq
dEpo=itor=--thFcllqh  Ei.thEr  a  Cirect  payeut  or  the  arFangenier't  ,:li
1.f,I
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Figure 3a  FLtrchasE-*nd-Assumpti(3n  tr:lnsacti|fn.  FEcaLtsB ef  the  FDID's
assLr.npticn  of  thrs  responsibility  at  a  cost  thet  does  not  deFend
on  the  banf,:s'  Fort+BI  io  decisisns.  banlis  can  continure  t6  r*strict
their  ewn attention  to  the  Lrnsh;|deC  area  o+  the  di=tribution,
{Inattention  tB  the  sheded  *reei  does  not  irrolv  that  the  banlls  are
indifferent  as  to  whether  the  returnE  tt]  their  port+olic]E  aFe  in
the  shaded  or  the  unshaded  area  o+  the  distribLltion,  It  si,mply
implies  that  they  are  indifferEnt  as  to  hor4 the  shaded  area  is
distri.buted,  That  is,  given  surbsidized  i.nsurance  and  limited
liability,  they  are  indifferent  about  potenti  al  lss=es  in  e::cess
o+  the  banf.;'s  catrital  ,  Frorn the  banks'  perspective"  any  point
i.rithin  the  Ehaded  aFea  i.s  equivalent  to  Rc.)  The  effects  of
deregulation  tran be  discussed  in  tern5  of. changes  in  the  sile  o*
the  shaded  area  of  the  distribLttion.  And  the  discussicn  of  these
ef+ects  can  tal!:e idvantage  of  the  relationshitrsr  id€nli+ied  in
Secticn  III,  bFtween  the  various  regulati.6nE  and  the  FaraoetFrs
o+  the  model .
Figure  fb  shor,rs  th*  e{fect  o+  eliminating  the  ceilings  on
interest  rRtes  that  banl.ls pay  their  depositors.  A€  Re,lulation
is  phased  out"  bani.;s bid  Lrtr  interest  rate=  in  their  individual
atte,rflFts  io  attract  rrore  funds.  Becalrse  of  the  higher  ccst  of
fllnds.  thp  rate  of  return  on  a=sets  at  which  thE  banl.:s jLrst  oa
s|-lrvive  i-q increased.  Alternatively  stated,  $i.th  Rn unchanged
capital  base  the  no$-sflialler  Epread  bstween  interest  paid  and
interest  earned  sLrbjects  the  FDIC  to  a  qreater  risf,:.  In  ter,ns
Fiqure  3b,.  R:  shi+ts  rightward.  and  the  shaded  area  gFows
accord i nol v.
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ofFigLrre  lc  shcwE the  effect  c+  relalrj.ng  entry  re5trictions.
The  Et-rpErnDrmal ratEs  o+  Fetl.lrn  are  rnadE  ptrEeiblE  by  arti{icially
rEstricting  the  nuftber  of  bantr charter=  qranted  and  by  f i:rbidding
nonbanl-.:  institLrtitrns  f rorn tromFeting  directly  with  chartered
banl{s.  The  actLral  extent  of  the  relaxation  o+  Entrv  regtricti.ong
varies  from  state  ttr  state  si.nce  the  individLral  Etates  as  b{ell  as
the  +ederal  Etrvernment  have  the  aLrthority  t6  iEsuE  banl:  charteFs.
ELtt  the  SLrFEFnoFmel rate  of  return  can  be  troflipetEd  away  partly  by
the  expansion  of  the  banlling  indurstry  itself  and  Fartly  by
c(]mpetition  +rom  nonban[r  institr-rtiongt  =uch  aE  the  mcney-iDarket
brokera,le  firme,  Competing  methcds  of  anrassinq  fundE  can  il1ow
nonbank  institr-rtions  to  bid  +or  asspts  that  may othsrwise  have
been  purchased  by  banhs.  The  decreasing  e+fectj.venes=  tr+ entry
restrictions  get5  translated,  at  lFast  in  part.  into  decreasing
ratEs  o{  retLrrn  ttr  asset  ptrrtfolias.  In  terfts  6+  FigurE  5c,  R=,
along  with  the  entire  port+o1io  distributiEnt  is  shi+ted  1*+tHard
until  the  banl{6'  rate  of  retnrn  on  assets  allows  for  no  drdrs than
e  nt]rrfiel  rate  o+  profit  for  the  bantring  indLlstFy.  A  greater
fractiBn  of  the  entire  distribLrtiEn  is  therebv  oushed  into  the
shaded  reqion  rp+lEcting  Ein incrE}Etge in  rish  etiposLire  e:{perientrFd
bv  the  FDIC.
Figure  f,d Ehows the  effect  of  relaxing  ass:t  restrictions.
In  a. ctrmpetitive  environmentr  bantts  r.r6u1d  tend  ta  adtrpt  the
afiount  af  {inantria1  ct]nservativism  consi5tent  wi.th  the  ri€k
.cre+er-ences  trf  depo€it-ors.  In  a  heavily  regLrlatEd  envirc.ninentr
banks  come ts  b€  l':ncjwn  €.s +inancially  conservstive  instil:Llti6ng
nat  becalr::e  tr+ their  own (]r  r--hEir depc|sitars'  rislL  pFe+erenceg
bLrt  beCaLISe  C'f  the  FFqifli  l-ii  |,1nq  i,nnFq€r'{  hv  +rrF  Fa.rr'1  rinf--,/
1BaLrthori ties  on  thE  banl,:s'  ssset  selectltrn.  Re=tritrtitrns  rn  -asset
sel ecti.on.  Ioan  sire.  and  credit  standnrds  have  ifi,pr=ed  binding
constreints  on  bsnks'  risl.;-tal;inrl  behavior.  As  ti]e5e  nsFEcts  trf
bantii ng  become rnore dEreqLrl  ated,  the  banlt=  become rnore
aggressive.  more  adventlrr esoflre  r  in  their  asset  selection.
FErrnittinE  sLrch a!qressiveness!  i,n  fact"  was  virtually  fiandated
by  the  el irni  neti,fn  of  interest-rate  ceilings  and  the  rela;*ation
of  Entry  restrictiong.  Etankg were  caught  j.n the  sqLree:e  bEtween
risin€  costs  and  faltin€  rates  o+  return  on  traditional  bank
pBrtfolios.  Easing  asset  restrictions  alIows  the  banks  to
lncreasE  their  rates  of  rEturn  bv  tal.:ino  bn  moFE risk--without
payi.ng  higher  rstes  +or  deposit  insurance.  PrababLy  the  most
visi.ble  instanceg  o+  st-rch  ri  s  l,:  tal'.:ing on  the  part  o+  banlis  are
the  lending  of  venture  caFital  f or- the  developrnent  of  al ternative
energy  EouFces  and  the  lendinB  of  large  sl.rms  to  +oreign  cs|-rntrieg
Ltnder circLrmstances  in  which  the  risk  of  de{aurlt  ig  sLtb=tan-
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represEnted  by  an  increase  in  the  variancF  of  the  distFibution.
Dlearly  the  bant{E'  chancps  for  a  high  Fort+ol  io  ret|.rFn  err
increased.  Rs,  the  mean of  the  Lrn5haded Fortion  o+  the
distriburticln  is  advanced  to  the  ri,lht,  Fut  jLrst  as  clearly  the
chances  +(]r  a  rui r]ous  l ow rEt|-rrn  sFE  i ncFeased  as  urel  I .  The
Ehaded  aFea  has  grown  still  lirqer.
It  miqht  bE  reiterated  here  that  these  FftEcts.  which  have
bEEn sEFerated  graphically  in  Figltres  f,b  tlrrolLqh  id  and
concEptLtal l y  in  the  di scl-rssion  af  the  Figures.  are  aEtually
intertwined.  That  iE.  thE  nearLv  girnutltaneolrs  Femoval  cf
interegt-rate  cFilingg!  entry  restr-iction€!  and  asEet
In  terrns  o+  Figure  3d,  the  increase  in  aqqressivenEss  is
19restritrtions  wi]1  ha're  both  di.rect  end  indirect  effects  on  the
c(fsts  trf  h,c'rror,rinq, the  pricE  of  sEset€.  ,cnd thE  rislliness  o4
asset  pnrtfsLios.  Lowered  entry  barrier=.  lnr  exarnpler  nray
attratrt  more  adventLrFesorne  entFants  r.Jhtr  bi d  Lrp the  costs  o+
borrowing  in  their  efforts  to  take  fuller  advantage  of  the  eased
assEt  Festrictions,  Fig|.rre  .T. then,  i.= nothing  msre  than  a
heuristic  device  for  Eorting  oLrt these  trombined  pffects.  41*.o.
the  use  of  the  noFrnal  curve!  +or  which  ri5k  is  meagured  by  the
variance.  fiay  sEri oursly  undergtate  the  risk  that  the  FDIC  is
:ssurning.  SLrbBidized  deposit  insLrFance  cot-rpled with  deregul.atitrn
cot.rld gi.,,.e  riEe  tc  a  sho6t-the-mcon  invegtment  Strategy.
Depending  on  wtrt.ld  events  and  forEiqn  af{aiFri  the  rate  o+  return
to  a  shoot-the-fitren  Fortfolio  iE  likely  to  be  either  e):trernely
high,  in  which  cage  the  bank  prof  i.tE  handsornely!  o|.  elrtremely
loH,  in  hhich  case  the  FDIC  ab€Grbe  the  losg.  Thureo under  scrne
sssumFtions  thE  di=tribution  in  FiELrre  3d  may be  a  birTrcdal
distribution  urith  the  hit-the-moon  mode lying  far  to  the  riqht
and  the  ,riss-thE-moon  rntrde  lvina  far  to  the  left.
Given  the  incenti.veE  trreRted  by  the  FDIC.  the  discr-tssi.on  cf
inve=tment  stFateEy  rirlhtly  focuses  on  the  behavior  o{  the  banlls
rathEF  than  the  behavi or  of  b6th  the  banlis  and  their  dEpoeitors.
With  deposits  insl-lFed +or  a  Rrice  that  does  net  ref]e€t  risti.  the
depositor  has  little  incentive  to  cornpare the  investment
stFste'Jies  o+  diffErEnt  banl.:s or  ttr  nonitor  the  hehavior  of  the
1!
bank  in  which  his  +Lrnds arE  deposited,  The  rnonitc,ring  taslt  hag
{allen  largely  to  the  regulatory  aLtthorities.  As  i nditr*rted  in
Sectic'n  II1.  rntrnitarinrl  the  banl..s'  ;apital  adeqr-racy  and  en+orcingcapital-ideqt.r€cy  reqLrirErtents  iE  one  of  the  ways  that  thE
al.rtflori.tiEs  may try  to  prevent  the  b;|nfis  fram  f i-rrther  leveraging
the  i nsurance  sr-rbsi  dy,  Eap  i tal  -adequtacy  reqlri rerrrsnts  havE  not
been  diEcussed  in  the  conte:lt  of  Fior-rre i  becaLr5e this  is  one
regLilatory  teEl  that  has  remained  at-rtside  the  gambi+- of  deregula-
tion.  In  fsct.  the  reglrlation  of  this  aspect  of  the  behavior  o+
bsnks  has  been  stiffen€d  in  recFnt  yeaFE  as  a  rrreans  of  partial  1y
o{fsetting  the  d€rEgLllation  of  the  other  aspects  of  thE  banhs'
behevi€r.  The  f allowinr;  Eection  discusses  this  and  otheF  r'rayg
that  requlatBry  authorities  have  coped--and  may have  to  cope--
wj.th  the  long-term  effects  o+  Firtial  deregulation,
v,  Eeelns Etlb  lEe  toee:ICr_q E!!cs!=  st  ent!3_g! Derequlatiotr
The  intrentives  crrated  by  pertial  deregulation  pit  the
immediate  interests  of  banl",;s  aEain=t  the  immedi  ate  interests  of
thB  rEqulatory  aLrthorities.  As  is  typical  in  this  Eort  of
environrnent,  short-terfi  expediency  tends  to  talie  prEcedent  over
long-ter-m  stability.  This  tradE-off  betr.reen 5hort-term  and  long-
term  stability  can  be  seen  in  the  efforts  of  the  re':ulatory
aLlthorities  to  detect  and  r.,ard off  banh  failures,  tD  deal  with
the  f ai lLrrps  ance  thFy  have  occurred,  and  to  carrect  the
incentive  strlr€ture  that  has  glven  rise  to  the  increasingLy
Ltnstable  banking  enwironment.  Coping  with  partial  deregulation
ran  be  diEcussed  Lrnder the  hpadings  o+  Capital  AdeqLracyr  Furchase
and  Assumptitrn  Agreements,  Var-iable-Rar-e  f  nsLrFancE FretniLrmE, 3nd
Fri../ati:ation  of  DeFosit  Ins|-rrance.
?1cFDi+el  Adpnrr:r'  -  is  a  ilrEasLiFe E+  a  banl":  ':
r==s==3Y'  r'dP  I  Lcl-L  c{uELlL(ElL'/
dbility  to  withstand  thF  Io=ses  thRt  it  FotEntiall-v  could  i.ncLLr'
The  standard  indicator  B{  a  banl,:'s  cspital  RdeqLtacy i.s  it:
caFital-ts-asset  ratj.6,  Eut  this  statiEtic.  h,hich  1eaves  6Lrt {]+
account  the  riskiness  o+  the  banlt's  asset  pBrtfolio.  i5  a
sl.riteble  'reasure  o+  catritEll  adequacy  over  tifie  only  i+  riEl:-
taking  behavior  on  the  part  of  the  banl;s  dBEs  ntrt  vary  ovEr  trrnF.
Thinking  in  terms  of  the  partsmeters  o+  Figure  ir  we €an  judge  the
bank's  capital  adequacy  more  clearly  by  considering  the  variencE
o{  the  portfolio  distriblrtion  and  the  lacation  of  Rc.  The
greater  the  variancei  the  qreateF  the  potenti  al  lossesi  the
+Lrrther  Rc  lies  to  the  right!  the  more  l i l'iely  that  lBs=es  r4i11 be
i ncurred.
Comparing  Figure  f,a with  Fiqure  3d  su,lEests  that  even  i{  the
rap i ta1-t  o-asset  ratios  Here  the  safie  for  the  twe  cagesr  the
latter  would  represEnt  less  capital  adequacy  than  the  foFmeF.
Fanlis  with  riskler  port+61ios  need  hiqher  r ip i t a  1  -t o-esset
rati6s.  Eut  as  ntrted  eerlier,  under  partial  deregulation,  banl';5
have  an  incentivE  to  decrease  rather  than  i.ncrease  their  tratritel-
to-asget  rat  i os.
The  regulatory  author  j.ties  have  been  aHare  o+  declining
trap  i tal  -tD-asset  ratios  across  thp  bantring  sy5tem.  In  their
attempt  to  r-Everse?--or  at  leagt  to  arrest--the  tFendr  this  aspect
t:f  benliing  is  being  sr-rbjected  to  gtricter  regulations  than  before
derEgulation.  Eeginning  in  lste  l.?A1t  {orma}  €Llidel ines  En
capi tal  adequacy  !.reFe  RnnoLrnced tc  repl  ace  the  l ess  tormal  r  irorE
discretionary,  prEceduFe€  that  weFe th€n  bein,3  used.
Signif  icantl'-.  one  o{  the  objectives  af  the  neul capital  quide-
ialinee  was  "to  addrEss  the  lonq-term  decline  in  capital  ratiss.
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particularly  those  o+ the  rnultinational  groLrF.  " Ihi  s  is  the
grtrup  of  banks  that  have  engaged  heavily  i.n  forei€n  Lending.
The  f ormrrl  quidelines.  hor.reverr  may bE  inconsiEtent  hlith  any
Ltltimate  solution  to  the  probLem.  BeceLrse o{  the  various
c-ategorieE  6f  benlie  and  their  relationship  to  the  di+ferEnt
reqnlatory  authorities,  the  actual  qLlidel ines  are  quite  cofiplex
The  nature  of  the  guridel ines  can  be  itlustrated  by  csneiderin€
thosE  adtrpted  by  the  Federal  Regerve.  Banks  were  divided  into
three  qroup--:  mLtltinational  banhs,  which  congist  6+  thE  17
larqest  bsnl{si  regional  banl"iE. which  consist  of  all  other  banks
ith  more  than  $1  bi11i6n  in  assetsi  snd  coilfiunlty  banks,  which
consi.st  of  alL  bant{s  with  legs  than  $1  billion  in  asEetE.  The
minitnLim atrceptable  catr  i t al -to-asset  rati.o  was  set  at  67. {or
cc.nm|-lnity ban[::sr :nd  FZ  +or  Feqional  bank5.  It  ]aas lnitial1y
unspecified  for  the  multinationalE  and  uJas  pres|.rrnably le5s  thsn
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The  inwerse  relationship  between  ,nln  j.mum  cap  i tErl.  -to-asset
ratios  and  bantr gi:e  Hol-rld be  jLrsti+ied  i+  thei,r  trortfoliog
dif{ered  only  i.n  si:e  snd  not  in  cornposition.  LaFger  bfrnli€.
which  alttltr,]latically  ta[.e  +Lrl  ler  Edvsntage  of  the  Fooling  o{
risl-.:s.  cen  ''nalie  do  t,,ith  a  relativelv  Ernil  ! er  capital  base.  BLtt
i{  the  larger  banllg  are  moFe aBgressivply  pn'laginB  in  risl-;-tahinB
behavior,  slrch  as  through  fsreiBn  lendingr  then  their  caFital-to-
a=Eet  ratitrs  should  be  lBrger!  not  Efia1Ier.  Further"  the  steir-
gteFped  qLrid€lines  create  an  parti  cr-rl:,rly  perveFse  intrentive  for
certain  banks  to  detrrease  their  traFital-to-asset  ratio=.  If  a
bank  with  aesets  jur=t  lrnder  El  billiBn  fails  tc, rneet the  guide-
35line  of  ot:.  it  rnav be  eble  to  incrEag€_its  asgets  to  jt-tEt  ove!-  El
bi 1  1i on  and  meet  the  guri  del i ne  af  57..
Tf  i q  n.1<q,i  hl  F  l-hnt  thr  ,irrr.ipl  i nF..i  were  tai  lored  to  rnatch
the  actual  trapitil  bases  of  thE  different  graups  of  banf::s at  the
time  the  guidelines  weFe irnposed.  To  have  done  athere.rise,  to
have  stipulated  a  capj.tat*to-3sset  ratio  independent  tr+ ben[.  si=e
or  to  have  stipLrlBted  one  thet  incFeE|ses  with  bank  si:er  l^tould
have  induced  major  adjustrnents  which.  by  themselves!  could  be
destabiliring.  It  xolrl d  have  required  the  contracti6n  o+  the
larger  banirs.  or  inviied  the  expansi6n  clf  the  smaller  banlag"  or
both.  At  best,  the  guidelines  actual  1y  adopted  will  impede  the
f Ltrther  deteriaratian  of  the  banking  systemr s  capitel  base.  At
worst,  they  will  i n  st i tl-rt  i on  al i =  e  an  ultimately  untenable  Eet  o+
circurnstsnceg  created  by  the  peFverse  incentives  o+  partial
der egu  l at i on.
Eqfghc=e  BEd  OE=lqplr-Str  6gL.EEO=O!9.  In  sone  cases  the
problem  of  capitsl  inadeqlracy  turns  into  the  Froblem  o{  bank
failure,  [4hen the  banl:  can  no  longer  keep  itE  doors  opPni  the
FDIC  iE  legally  bornd  to  make good  on  €ll  the  banlt's  Ltnnet
abligations  tcl  depcsitors  for  an  ar-noLrnt  Lrp to  $1+{}r 4rcl(-)  per
atrcount.  ELtt in  most  instances,  the  FDItr  has  provided  {ul1
coveraqe  to  the  deposi tors  by  arranqin'l  foF  the  sale  of  the
{ai1ed  bank.  Under  its  Purchase  snd  A=suftption  policy!  all
liabilities  of  the  failed  banli,  incl.Lrdinq  uninsured  deposits,  are
tr-ansfEFred  to  an  a=-=Llfiing  bsnl,:.  I+  accornplished  overnight,  a
PLLrchaEe and  AssLlrnFtion  transatrti.trn  avoidE  even  th*  interrLrption
i.n avsilabilit:.,  o+  fundE  to  depc=itor=.
the  Ehort-tertn Dealing  wi.th  fsilures  i.n thl.=  way  is  tobenefit  n€t  only  of  deptrsitors,  bLLt also  of  the  asgurming banl{  and
thE  FDIC  itself,  Even  thcalreh the  {:ri1pd  b&nl{ may have  a  negative
Pre=Fnt  value  net  of  "goodrJill.  "  the  assurnin,l  bank  iE  al so  the
F€Fi  -i  e-+  rJ  +h6  r',a^,
:-odwi  11  . "  an  int€ngible  asset  whitrh--eEpecial1y
in  the  caEe  of  a  failed  banl:  whose  actual  ooodHill  is  minitnal--
rF+lects  the  disconnted  value  o+  the  bank  charter.  tJhat  thp  FDIC
seeg  as  negative  capital  value  is  seen  by  the  asst-rming hanli  as
positive  caFital  value.  But  this  difference  in  perspective
per5ists  only  so  long  as  entry  restrictions  are  rnaintained.
Thus,  the  FDIC's  ability  to  meet  its  obligations  to  a  +ailed
banli's  deptrsiterg  by  soliciting  the  cooperation  of  other  bant{g
t+i11  be  diminished  over  tirne  as  deregr.rlation  eats  away  at  the
entry  restri  cti  ons.
Further.  the  reliance  on  Purchase  and  Assurnption  agreements
for  a  short-term  sclution  to  thE  prBblern  of  bantr  f ai ll.ires  is
tikely  to  aBqravate  the  long-term  problem  for  the  banking  systern
as  a  whole.  FiqLtre  f,d suqgests  that  subsidirFd  deFosit
insurance,  cot.lpled  with  dereqLllationr  increages  the  FDIC'=
expo5Llre  to  risk.  If  the  r€turn  on  agset  portftrliog  *re
increasingly  likely--aE  derequlation  proceede--to  falI  bElow  Rc.
and  !+  the5e  portfslios  are  absorbed.  as  a  matter  of  FDIC  Folicyr
by  the  €urvivinq  banll=,  then  the  survivinB  banks  are  even  more
1ihely  ttr  experiencF  retLrrns  thet  fal]  below  Rc,  The  image  that
co.nes tc  mind  is  one  cf  a  do:en  lifeboats  on  the  hiBh  Eea=.  All
irE  loaded  to  cBpatrity"  and  Eomr  have  leakE.  trJhen  sne  leal:y  boet
sinl,:sr  the  occlrpants  are  transferred  into  the  boats  that  are
Etill  afloat.  Thi.s  Ehort-term  =olurtion  +-o the  trrtrblen  Bf  one
?5sinkinq  boat  may be  irFFsiEtiblp--in  spite  of  it=  compoltndinq  trf
the  1on!-term  Froblem.  In  an  anslogous  way  the  Furchase  and
A=+t-Lcnptic,n  policy  may bp  rnaintairiing  ehort-tarm  stability  at  the
price  o{  long-tern  instabiLity.
Vgf,ieE!e=8e!e  Insurancg  Premlgms.  The  FDIC  doe:  recognize
thp  need  to  deal  raith  the  problem  at  its  root,  to  chan€e  the
incentivFs  that  the  banks  {ace  so  aB ttr  decrease  the  banks'
willingness  to  engagE  in  ri€h-taki.ng  behavior,  Accordingly.  the
FDIC  has  recommended  a  system  of  variable-rate  premiLrrns  based  on
three  rigl.  categories:  norrnal,.  high,  and  very  high,  The  ./ast
fiajority  of  the  bankg  would  be  classified  ag  norrnal ,  Eanl.;E  hrith
high  expos|.rre to  either  interest-rate  or  credit  riEt{  !4ould  be
classified  as  high-rish  banks.  And  banks  with  hiqh  e::posure  to
bEth  interest-rate  snd  credit  Fiskr  Br  banks  Hith  dangerously  low
capital  ratiog.  tJo|-tld  be  claesified  as  very-hiqh-risfr  banl'is.
Bsna{s in  tl're normal  cateoorv  wsutd  contin  e  to  Fecei'/€  the  f uL  1
6O:a  rebate  of  the  their  FDIC  premiufii  as  discussed  in  Section  III;
benks  in  the  hir]h-risk  category  would  receive  hal+  that  rebat€i
and  hanf,:s  i n  thE  'rery  hi gh-ri  sk  trategory  wo|-rl  d  recei  ve  no  Febate.
The  most  nDteworthy  implication  of  the  FDIC's  proFosal  is
that  the  FDIE  Lrnderstands  the  nature  c|f  the  prDblElii'I.  Solving  the
probl€rn  requires  that  the  deposii-  in€Lrrance  be  priced  irl
sccordance  with  the  risk  asslrrned by  the  insurer.  BLtt sdopting
variable-rate  prerni.  Llrns  is  just  one  small  st=p  towards  that
strlLttion.  It  i.s  anaLogct|-rs  to  the  adoption  of  a  thrEe-tier
minir'ufir wage  as  a  strIutitrn  to  the  proble.n  of  LrnernFloyment traLr5ed
by  mi  ni mLrn-war;e  l eqi sl Rti cln.  The  FDI6  has  nc  wa_v  o{  t:nowi  ng  that
banks  sholrld  be  di',,i,cied i.nto  three  risk  cateqories  rether  than
?6thirteen  trr  thirty.  It  has  no  way  o+  qaLti?inE the  actliarral  vallle
of  the  i nsl.lred  ri  stt  of  each  of  the  catEqori  ee.  Thr-r=, i t  has  no
way  6+  calculating  the  appropriate  inst-lrance  premiLtm or  o+
adjLtsting  that  prerniurn as  market  conditions  change.  At  begt.
variable-rate  premiums  Fepresent  an  extrenely  crude  appro:lirnation
of  a  ,narket  solurtion  to  the  problem.
Etfyelrz_Clten  e!  DEp.eEit  ln=grgnge.  The propo5al  o+
variable-rate  premiums  point5  the  hlay toward  one  possible  long-
term  solL{tion  to  thr  problem:  the  privatiration  cf  deposit
1A
t n  SLtrance  ,
of  deposit  i.ngurance  by  private  aqencies  wcul d  fundament5'l 1y
reconfigure  the  rElevant  rnarket  forcrs.  Banks  wo|-rld choose  amonB
c€anpeting  insureFsl  insuFers  Hol-rld ccrnpete  with  one  another  on
the  basis  of  the  coverage  o++Bred  and  the  premiurns  trhargEd.  The
rnaFliFt test  of  profit  and  loss  would  allow  {or  the  establish,nent
of  actLr6ri  al I y  sor-rnd prem j.  u.ns f or  the  coverage  provi  d€d.  And
that  samE market  test  would  a.l  low  for  less-than-ful1  coveraoe
that.  while  acceptabte  to  both  the  banks  and  the j.r  depositorE!
wolrl  d  hold  the  problem  of  moral  harard  i.n  checl{.
The  long-teFm  consequences  o{  privati:ation  are  these
depieted  j.n Figure  1c,  t/ith  complete  deregurlation.  including  thE
phasinq  out  o+  the  FDIC!  rnarliet  {orces  courld  bring  into  balance
the  i.nt-erests  of  the  bankst  the  bank's  deFeEitors,  and  the
deposit  insurers.  BLlt to  opt  for  thiE  long-term  sollrtion  is  ts
w€rsen  the  short-teFm  prcblern-  The  period  over  brhich  the  banking
s'lstem  become5  :djusted  ttr  =Lich a  radicEllv  dj.+{erent  Eet  ef
incFntives  woLrld Lrnd6ubtedly  be  a  tr-rrbulent  periEd.  H€ncE.  the
The  incentive  strllctuFe  inherent  in  the  or6vision
?7trade-d++  between  short-tErm  and  long-terrr  stelhility  i=
i 11r-rstrated  ,f  ncE  )oFe.
V] i  SuqmBf.v Vlehr.
There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  banhing  syEtem  is
rnherentlV  Lrnstable.  Nor  is  there  reason  to  doubt  that  the
regurlatory  authorities  may be  able  to  create  a  set  of
interloctring  and  trBunter ba.l  anc  i ng  regulatitrns  that  will  maintain
some sort  of  artificial  stability  +trr  e  period  o+  y€ars  or
possibLy  decades.  Eut  the  current  environrnent  +aced  by  the
banking  systrfil.  an  environfient  in  Hhich  sorn€ requlatorl,  g56-
straini-s  are  being  eased  or  phased  olrt,  while  sther  re€traintg
srE  beinrf  rnaintai.ned  or  even  Eti++en€d.  is  nEither  fish  nor  fowl.
It  does  not  require  by  law  that  the  banks  operate  in  thE  public
interest,  nor  does  it  create  the  set  of  incentiveg  that  wot-rld
entice  the  banks  to  sperate  in  such  a  +ashion.  This  hybrid
enviFonment  of  regulatory  constrai.ntg  and  fiarl,:et  incentives  will
almost  surrely  le*d  to  lBng-terrn.  or  strlrctLrral  ,  instsbility  of
the  bankino  svstem,
Through  thE  decadEE.  the  trritics  e+  lntErvEntisn  have  arquEd
that  one  regulation  calls  for  -rnother.  There  ge=ms to  be  no
rEs'.ing  place  short  o+  some coinFrehensive  get  of  regulations.
The  arguments  preEented  in  the  present  FapeF  =LtEgest that  this
principle  ot  regulation  &pplies  to  dEregulation  as  welL.  One
piEce  o+  dereqrrl ation  cal 1s  for  another.  I+  structural
instabilit-v  is  tc  be  avorded.  thEre  se€ms t6  be  no  r=sting  place
short  C]f s  thorol(ghgaing  rflrnFetitive  rnarket.
?ENeles.
1.  For  an  eartieF  effort  1,,,i  th  sirnj.  lar  trbjectives  and  conclLrsi6nE.  gee
John  A.  liarel,:en  snd  Nei I  l{al I ace.  ,'Detrosi t  InEurance  and  Banl.;
ReguJ.aii on:  A Partial  EqL{ilibriun  Er:position,  "  qggEnal  o!  EU5IIEEE,
vol .  5i,  no.  I  (1979)!  pp.  41i-51.  Fiaretren and  Wallace  ernploy  state-
pre+erence  thecry  to  show,, amsng other  thing€"  that  "under  an  FDIC-
type  ingl.rrance  scherne.  thr  bantring  industry  holds  as  ri=ky  a
portfolio  as  regulators  ellot,r....',  tp.  413).
3.  Strictly  speaking,  the  vertical  gap  between  the  shaded  area  and
the  norrnal  curve  is  meagured  in  frequency  units.  Er-rt  for  our  pur-
poses{  the  un}'ri  ll  ingness  to  insure  10  to:C)  peFcent  trf  the  bank
+ailLtres  shtrLrld be  interpreted  instead  es  the  unwj.  IIinqness  to  insure
Itl  to  ?() percent  of  the  1os=  associated  with  each  failure.
5.  For  a  thorouqh  treatment  of  the  Etability  Froperties  of  sompeti-
tive  banhing  f ro,n both  a  theoretical  and  an  historical  perspective.
see  LaHrence  H.  White.  EfCg  BAqEfqS  iE  Btilgin!  TheoFVn  Historyl.  and
leE3lg  iCembridgE.  England:  Cambridge  University  PresE,  1?44).
4.  si.nce  the  Fenn  Square  Etank +ai lLrre  i.n  mid  198?,  the  FDIC  has  uEed
a  modif i.ed  payoltt  approach  to  settle  eome small-ban[  {ailnres.  tdith
this  approach  the  FDIC  reirnbr-trses  insured  depositors  in  {r-rl  1t, while
uningttred  deposi tors  receive  Iess  than  l+O  percent  payor-rt.  the  short-
falI  being  determined  by  the  FDIC's  estirnate  o+  the  recoveFy  valu€  of
the  failed  banh,  ThE LrninsLrFed depo=itors  raceive  payolrts  ran';inB
+rcrn 4O tD  6{} Fercent  o+  the  actr.tal  value  of  thei.r  deposits.
The  FDIC'e  Fesponse  to  the  problens  of  Continental  Illinoig
represents  a  depErture  from  the  norm  in  dealinq  u,,ith 1&rge  banhs.Unsble  to  arrange  a  Purchace  and  AsElr,npt  j,,fn aqFeernent.  the  FDItr
i mp  1€rrrented  a  rescLrE  Fl an  Lrnder  Hhi ch  the  FDIC  i tseL  f  bEca'rne d  maj sr
=tocl':hol  der  o+  the  banr"r.  Ho',rE./er.  two  nonths  bef ore  the  resEue  F  1an
was  irnFlementE?C, the  FDIC  agr-Fed to  qltarentee  a1l  Conti.nental
depositors  and  creditors  of  whaiever  sire.  The  wi.rlinqness  to  extend
thE' luarentee  to  depoEitors  Frior  to  failure  and  to  inclutde  creditorE
st  aIl  Has  a  major  policy  innovatitrn.
5.  The  FDIC  asserts  that  ,,standards  shot-rld be  set  to
extent  to  r.Jhich errors  of  overpricing  risl-;  occur.,,
InE!!rancE  f!  g  QhEtrSilq  Enylronment  (ujashington.  D.
Deposit  lnsurance  Corporati.ont  1?gI),  ch.  !t  p.  F.
mi.nimire the
5ee  lgggsi  t
C.:  Federal.
5.  SEe,  for,  instance!  Getrrge  J.  StiglEr,  ',The Theory  of  Economlc
Feglriation.  "  EClL  JSU1qA!  ef  Eqetremlgg  and  tlalaqe.nent  Sg,lence!  ?
iSpring,  l97lr,  reprj.nted  in  The  EillrEn  AEd lhe  Stalei  fssays  on
E*gglBtlcn  (chicago:  univFrsity  6+  trhicego  Fre=s,  r97ar i  and  sam
F€*ltzrnanr  "Toward  a  Nore  General  Theory  o+  ReELllation.,,  Journal  trt
Lsw  and  EcolorniEE.  \,o1  .  19.  no.  A  (August"  197o).  pp.  f11_4g.
7.  This  resLtlt  does  not  depend  upon  any  speclal  Essllrnptions  about
rnarket  structure.  liabitity  ru1es.  or  risk  preferences,  It  follows
directly  from  the  f ;{ct  th€t  the  rate  tr+ rrt.Llrn  ln  this  analysis  is
reckenec  net  o{  the  insurance  premium:  An  actuarially  sound  Fremj.Lrfir.
csnsiderations  of  rish  preferences  agide!  leaves  the  mean rate  of
retLrrn  unaffectedl  a  premiurn  of  rero  shifts  the  ,nesn rate  to  the
ri qht  of  the  mode.B.  The  pctential  fcr  banks.  even  :trll.ectivEly,  havin'l  this  E++ect  on
the  rateg  cf  return  was  assLrmed  awav  bv  ii*reken  and  UJal  lsce:  "ihe
banl:ing  i.nCltstry  iE  a  monopoly
otherHiFe'sfial1"..,.  "  ft:arElj:en
Fank  R*'lul at i cn  r "  p.  413.  The
of  this  e+fect  is  addressed  by
present  authors.
suFFliEr  c+  deposit  :er'/ics=r  bLit  i=
.and  t a11ace.  "D€trosit  Insui-ance  and
gueetion  of  the  Ernpirical  signi+icance
neither  F:arek€n  and  t{allacE  nor  bv  the
L  The  rnanner o{  trhsrecteri:ing  the  banking  industry  is  congistent
y,tith  a  recent  assessdrent  by  John  Hareken.  "To  deregul  ate  f Ltrther  end
never  do  anything  aboLtt the  FDIC  woLrld be  to  invite  a  cFash. "  ,John
H.  l.:arehen"  "The  First  Step  in  Fank  DerEgulation:  What  abollt  the
FDIC?  4qer_f.qCE EcqBorngg Eeyiql,  vol  ,  7f,.  no,  :  (ltayr  1985),  p.  !115.
14,  lnteFest-rate  festrictions  Eti.  11  remain  on  banfi  savings  deposltg
tF  1,/!  percent  cei  I ing)  ,  on  Nolrl accEuntE  tr+  leEE  than  168,3(:)Ll  f or
individuals  and  non-pro+it  organi:ations  t=  L/4  percent  ceilrng),  and
on  time  depo€its  of  lesg  than  6?"5tlQ  with  maturrity  6f  7  ta  Al
days  (5  1z'3 F€rcent  ceilinE).  In  addition!  blrsiness  clrEtorner-s,
who are  not  elqible  t6  hold  either  NCttri  -account  or  Super-Noul-
accor-lnt  balanceg,  are  FLlbjected  to  the  Llltimat€  restrictisn  (Cl
percent  treiling)  on  their  demand-deposit  balances.
11.  Energy  loans  figured  heavily  in  the  problems  tr+ both  the  Penn
SqLtarE Fanl.  and  Ctrntinental  Illinois;  major  money-center  and  regional
ban[:5  have  enEsgEd  e]ltensively  in  foreign  Iending.
1f.  "CasLtal  observation  i.ndicate:  that  tinvestors.l  are  vEFy  rn|-tch
awarp  o+  what  money  merliet  f r-rnd bal.  ance  sheets  arer  mt.rch  r'noFe  -iware
than  of  Hhat  bank  balantre  sheets  are.  Nor  i€  it  accidental  thatf unds  and  banl,;s dif  {er  eo  in  their  balancF  sheFts.'r  John  H.  }iarel{en.
"Deregulatin€  Cornr'erciRl  EtanliF:  The  l.{attrhr,Jfird Shol.rld  Be  Cautionr  "
Eedere!  ReEervg  BeA!  el.  ft-nnqaes!!=  gggflefly  Eeyleg  i  Sp  r i n  q  -Srtnrner .
l9E1).  P.  :1.
13.  Larry  D.  l4a11r  "Will  trapital  Adequacy  RequirEmEnts  Slow  the
Developrnent  o+  IntErEtate  Bankin'l?"  f,conorllg  FtEVi  Er,.r!  Federal  R€.seFVe
Bank  o{  Atl ants  (i,!ay,  1?BJ) ,  p.  47.
14.  These  '!Lti  del ine5
Fequri  rernentsr "  p.  47.
mLrl  tinati  onal s  to  an expl i ci t  5Z  reduirernent.
15.  t*Ja]1  notes  this  perverEity  i.n the  context  of  holding-trtrmpany
expansion.  "Cornrnunity banking  organi:ations  that  grow  into  reqional
banr{inB  orBani=ations  can  meet  the  guidelinEs  with  O.5  pPrcentage
points  less  total  capital  ...  If  the  guidelines  Rre  taken  literallyt
a  hoJ.ding  con'pany  with  assets  of  $?5O million  and  th€  exact  minj.nu.n
total  capital  t(3 classify  as  a  Zone  1 coanrfiLlnity  bank  coLrLd f j.nancE
the  purchase  c+  a  SEf  million  bank  r"rith debt  and  sti1l  ernerge with
tatal  capital  exceeding  Zone  1 guidelines  as  a'reli6naI  holding
comFany. "  Wall,  "CapitaI  Adeqr-racy  Reqlti.remEntst  p.  4.7.
16.  For  a  discr-rssion  o{  tFe  pt]EEibi}ity  of  private  deposi t  insl.lrance
and  o+  fi.alting the  transition  {rofi  FDIC  to  trrivate  in=nrers.  see
Euqenie  Di-rdding Shcrt  and  6eral  d  F.  O'Driscoll,  Jr.  "Deregnl  ati  on  and
DEPosit  Insurancer  "  EcongeiE  Egyi"CU, Federal  freserve  Bank  of  Dallas
(September,  19Afl " 
pp.  11-33.
were  gleaned  {rom  ttalI  !  "Capital  Adequacy
The  Fed  has  Fecently  noved  to  Eubject  the
4AFFEND  I X
I'IAJOR  BANI{IN6  ACTS  IN  THE UNITE!,  STffTE5:  r9?7  TO FRESEI'IT
I.  The  I'ltrFadden  Fankino  Act  (1?:7).  "an  act  to  further  amend the
natj.onal  banking  laHs  and  the  Federal  Reserve  Act,  and  ftrr  other
trLrrtroses.  "
A.  Asset  Power:
(1)  to  place  limits  on  the  malrimurfl  Fercentaqe  o+  a  national
bank's  capital  and  surplLrs  invested  in  the  obliBations
of  one  isguer  or  loaned  to  one  issurer.
(?)  to  allow  national  bankE  to  rnalie real-eEtate  1oans.
B.  Branchi  ng
(1)  to  permit  national  banl{s  to  acquiFe  gtate  banlts  and  kEeF
the  branchE5  if  the  scquisition  would  be  lawf ltl  under
(?)  to  treFmi.t national  banlis  to  branch  in  states  wheFe  st.lch
branchi  no  is  laarf  ul .
(a)  surbject  to  regulations  limiting  branfhing  1n
smaller  cities  *nd  towns.  irreEpectlve  6f  more
1i beral  state  I aws.
(b)  slrbject  to  +-he descl-etion  o+  the  Comptroller  of  the
Currency.
II.  The  Bankinq  Act  6+  1?55,  "an  act  to  pFovide  for  the  EafeF  and  more
effective  usE  cf  asgets  of  banks.  to  requlate  interbantr  centrol  r  to
prevent  the  undue  diversion  o+  +LLnds  into  gtrecLrlative  operatit]ns.  and
+or  other  purpo--es.  "A.  Asset  Fowers
(1)  to  prevEnt  rnernber  banlis  from  beinq  a++iliated  prith  Rny
f irrn  enqaqed  in  the  =EcLrrities  bLrsiness,
(f)  to  establi  sh  lini.tE  on  the  lBans  made bv  banlls  tc
af+iliatesr  including  to  hol ding-company  a+filiates.
E,  Liability  Fowers
(1)  to  prohibit  the  payment  o+  interest  on  demand deposit
accc:unts.
(?)  to  ernpoHer  the  Federal  Feserve  Board  to  regulate
interest  rate5  paid  on  Eaving  and  tirne-deposit  accounts.
C.  Deposi t  Inslrrance
(l)  to  establish  the  FedeFal  Deposit  InsuFance  Eorporatien
{FDIEI.
'  (?)  to  require  all  ,nembeF  banks  t6  becorne stockholders  o+
the  FDIC.
III.  The  Bank  Holding  Cornpany Act  o{  1?56.  "an  Act  to  dpfine  bank
holding  comFaniesr  control  their  f LrtLrre e)rpansic'n,  and  requj.re
divEstment  of  their  nBnbant{ing  interests.
A.  De+inition:  to  control  any  Eornpany directly  or  indirectly
hol di ng  i5  pertrent  or  m6Fe of  te,ro or  fnore  banks.
B.  Asset  PoweFg
(1)  to  prevent  banl{  holding  corflpanies  {rom  acquiring
additional  banks  wi  thout  oerrnissiGn  from  the  Federal
Reserve  Foard.
(:)  ttr  prevent  banks  f roin  acquirinq  bugineEses  ltnrelated  ta
banking  {bl-it e:rernpting  bursinesses  "o+  a  {inanci-eI  o
f idr-rci,aFv.  or  insLlrance  natLlFE'r).
r{;)  to  regul.ate  the  prBcese  o+  dive€titlrre  o{  nonban[,: assFts
by  banh  holdinq  cornFanies.
IV,  The  Fantr Holdinrl  trompany Act  Ammendments of  1?7O,  "legislation  to
atnend the  Bank  Holding  Company Act  so  as  ttr  brinq  one-bank  htrldinE
trompanies  under  the  control  tr+ the  Federal  Reserve  Eoard. "
A.  Definition:  to  retain  the  1?56  definition  o+  what  congtitutes
a  permissible  bank-related  activity  for  bank  holdinE  cotnpanies
(bLtt to  chanBe  the  lanquage  of  the  definition).
B.  Asset  Powers
(1)  to  give  greater  diEcretion  to  the  Federal  Re5erve  Etrard
in  determj.ninB  when  a  tro.npany control  s  a  banh.
(!)  to  include  a  provision  aqainst  a  tie-in  of  serv:.ces
provided  by  bank=  even  if  the  banks  are  not  part  of  a
htrlding  c6mpany.
V.  The  Deregr-rlation  and  f'lonetary  Control  Act  of  1?8O.  "an  act  to
+acilitate  the  irnplementation  o+  ntrn€tary  ptr1icy,  to  Frrtrvide  for  the
'lradt-tal  elimination  of  all  the  lirfiitations  on  the  rateE  of  interest
which  are  psyable  on  deposits  and  acctruntsr  and  to  suthsri:e  interest-
bearing  transaction  accountsr  and  for  other  purposes.  "
ff.  Asset  Foners
(1)  t€  authori:e  {ederal1y  chartEFed  Eavi ngs-and-l  oan
aEsociations  ttr  malie real-estate  snd  conEtructitrn  loang
end  consumer  loans  for  personal.  family,  or  household
purpo€-es;  to  enqage  in  credit  card  operations  and
exerci  ge  tFLtst  trowErs.
(3)  to  authcri:e  +Ecieral ly  chartered  mutlral  savings  banl:s  to
mal{e com,nerciaL,  cc]Fporatei  and  business  Ioans  Lrp to  5
JDeFcent  of  the  b;nf,:  's  aEsets  t4ithin  the  state  urhere it
is  l,ocated  or  within  75  rniles  of  the  banli" s  horne of {i.se.
B.  Liebility  Powers
(1)  to  provide  the  oderly  Fheseaut  and  elimj.nation  of
interest  rate  trei.  linBs  on  deposit€  and  atcounts  as
rapidly  as  economic  condition5  v{arFEntr  bLlt  within  a
sl.  x  -year  peri  od.
(:)  to  establ  ish  the  Depository  Institutions  Deregulation
Committee  (DIDC)  to  inpleraent  the  phaseout  of  interest-
rate  trei 1  i nqs.
(J)  to  perrnit  all  deposltory  institutions  to  offer
Ne'lotiable  Order  of  tArithdrahral  (No[,J) accounts  to
individuals  and  nonprofit  i nst i tut  i ons.
C.  Deposit  Insurance:  to  raise  f rorn $4(,,  {x]O ts  lBl0o!OO0 thE
insurance  on  insured  accounts  provided  by  the  Federal  Deptrsit
Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC),  the  Fedaral  Savings  and  Loan
Insurance  CorporatiEn  {FSLItr).  ane  the  National  Credit  Union
Share  Insurance  Fund  (IICUSIF).
VI.  The  6arn-5t.  Eerm€in  Deoositorv  Insti.tutic:ns  Act  of  1?g?,
A,  Asset  Fower5
t1)  Bankg
(a)  to  rsire  the  lending  limits.of  member banks  on
1t:ans  not  fully  secured  from  l{t  percent  to  l5
percent  of  unimpaired  caFital  and  5urP1u5.  (An
additional  1fi percent  o{  caPital  may be  lent  tE  the
same borrovrEr  if  th€  loan  is  +Ltl1v  secltred.  )
(b)  to  elifiinate  or  modify  restrictions  6n  real-estate
.1E
lending  by  national  banlts  in  +avtrr  o+  limitations
EEtabl i=hed  by  the  Office  of  Comptroller  o+  the
Eurrency  (OCC),  and  to  el irninate  restri.ctions  €n
national  banks'  actine  as  real-estate  brokers.
(c)  to  al 1ow  one  oF  r'nc}re  banks.  even  though  nat  .ne,nbErE
tr+ a  htrlding  cofnpany,  to  forfi  a  banlt-service
corporation  to  provi.de  Eervices  to  bantiS or  non-
banks,  snd  to  eEtabl  ish  limits  on  the  percentage  of
' 
capital  and  assets  of  banks  so  investEd.
{d)  to  amend the  Eanh  Holding  Company Act  to  state  that
the  provi=ion  of  insurance  as  a  principal  r  agentt
or  brolter  is  no!  "a  closely  rel  ated  banking
activityr  "  and  to  mel{e certain  *r,c=ptions  to  this
pFohibition.
(!)  Savings  end  LoanE
(a)  to  authori=e  commercial  loans  Lltr to  10 percent  ot
their  ae5ets.
(b)  tb  authori:e  non-residential  real-estate  ltrans  Llp
tc  40  percent  of  their  assets.
(c)  to  authoFi:e  ctrnsLrmer loans  up  to  f,Cr  peFcent  o+
their  asgets.
Liabi  l ity  Fowers:  to  enable  al 1  depcsitary  instituttions  ta
offer  a  ftonFy  marl':et  depo€it  account  "dirFctly  equrivalent  te
and  cDmpEtitive  with  noney  market  rnurtual +(ndE. "
Geographic  Deregulation:  To  enhantre  FDlC  and  FSLIC  powerE  to
deal  with  tr6ubled  f j.nsnc  j.al  instit  tions  by,  among i:ther
things,  permi.tting  them  Lrnder  lifiited  circltm=tances  to  effect
interstate  and  cross-indLrstFy  merqers.
:
tr.